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Kim Yung Sik is a major figure in the history of science in East Asia, and  
in the history of world science. His leadership has been evident not only  
in a considerable number of perceptive and original publications, but also 
through his role in establishing a vibrant centre of research at Seoul 
National University, and in training a whole generation of scholars now 
working in Korea and elsewhere. This collection of twelve articles, 
originally published over a number of decades, gives us an opportunity to 
reflect on his accomplishment, and in the process to learn from the acute 
insights that many of them embody. 
The book is divided into three sections: Science and Confucian scholars, 
Social and Cultural Contexts of Science in East Asia, and Comparative 
Problems in the History of Science in East Asia. The reader who is familiar 
with Kim’s work will not be surprised to see that two of the four essays  
in the first section relate to Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200). The first essay of the 
four, ‘Zhu Xi on nature and science’ is as the author notes a presentation 
that reflects the conclusions that the author has set out at length in his 
wideranging book on Zhu Xi’s thought (Kim, 2000). The second essay looks 
in detail at three important philosophical concepts in Zhu Xi’s work, 
‘analogical extension’ (leitui 類 推 ), ‘investigation of things’ (gewu  
格物) and ‘extension of knowledge’ (zhizhi 致知). Given the immense 
importance of Zhu Xi’s writing in forming the consciousness of many of the 
literati of late imperial China, as well as of Korea, two articles out of 12 
devoted to this great thinker seems a very fair allowance. The third essay is 
devoted to ideas about the role ascribed to Heaven in production tech-
niques in Song Yingxing’s 宋應星 ‘Heaven’s Work in Opening Things’ 
(1637), the author’s translation of the title Tian gong kai wu 天工開物. 
Significantly, this essay was originally written as a contribution to a book 
in honour of Kim’s teacher, Charles Gillispie (1918-2015), who, amongst 
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other things, worked on the natural historical aspects of French technical 
writings of the eighteenth century. Here Kim reveals to us an aspect of 
Song Yingxing’s book that is easily forgotten if it is treated as no more than 
a quarry for information on technical practice in late Ming China: what did 
the author think was the role played by ‘Heaven’ (tian 天, the entity with 
whose name his title begins) in the many human activities he describes and 
analyses? The fourth essay deals with the topic ‘Science and the Confucian 
tradition in Chǒng Yak-Yong’s (丁若鏞 Jeong Yakyong, 1762-1836) work.’ 
Jeong, a member of the yangban literati class in the later Joseon period, was 
an active official who also left us a great body of writing, from which 
scholars have been able to extract much material of interest relating to such 
technical topics as astronomy, harmonics, medicine and geography. He is 
also well-known for the construction of an efficient lifting machine that 
was used in the construction of fortifications. Despite this, Kim’s careful 
examination of Jeong’s writing taken as a whole set in the context of his 
official activity, does not as he points out reveal someone who can be said 
to have seen ‘science and technology’ as a distinct and important aspect of 
human activity. On the contrary, Jeong was only interested in such topics 
“when their practical utility appeared to him as something that would help 
solve the problems of the day or better understand the Confucian classics.”  
The second part of the book ‘Social and cultural contexts of science in 
East Asia’ opens with an article first published as long ago as 1982, on 
‘Problems in the study of the history of Chinese science.’ This piece of writ-
ing mainly centres on the ‘Why not’ question—often phrased as “Why did 
the scientific revolution not take place in China?”. Kim’s careful examina-
tion of the problems posed by the way this question has been framed, and 
the ways that scholars have attempted to answer it is still valid today to a 
large extent. It is however notorious that the question continues to be asked 
today, although mostly by those who do not read the work of specialist 
scholars in the relevant fields. The second essay ‘Confucian scholars and 
specialised scientific knowledge’ underlines the fact that in pre-modern 
China, as in pre-modern Europe, the topics focused on by modern histo-
rians of science and technology were not seen as suitable for study by 
specialists alone, but formed part of the broad spectrum of knowledge that 
a truly educated person might be expected to master. After the short but 
wide-ranging essay on ‘Science and religion in traditional China,’ some of 
the questions raised in the preceding section are looked at in a new 
perspective in ‘Science and bureaucracy in traditional China.’ Rightly, this 
stresses the extent to which the bureaucratically structured forms of activi-
ty in which scholars engaged for large parts of their lives conditioned the 
way they developed and applied a wide range of competences.  
The third and final section of the book ‘Comparative problems in the 
history of science in East Asia’ contains four essays. The first of these ‘The 
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‘why not’ question of Chinese science: the scientific revolution and tradi-
tional Chinese science,’ is in some ways a new look, two decades later, at 
some of the questions raised in the first essay of the second section of this 
book. Much of it is an acute dissection, with concrete historical compar-
isons, of what, if anything, such questions might be taken to mean. On the 
positive side, it is certainly true that the search for answers to the questions 
posed has led to the careful examination of many social, intellectual and 
historical aspects of pre-modern China that might otherwise not have 
drawn so much attention. On the pessimistic side, Kim points out that we 
may get answers that amounts to no more than saying “The scientific revo-
lution did not occur in China because China was different from the West.” 
After considering such large and sometimes problematic issues, the reader 
may be refreshed by two more specific historical studies. The first, on 
‘Ideas of the earth’s rotation in seventeenth and eighteenth century East 
Asia’ is an examination of the historical evidence drawing on material from 
China, but also from two Korean thinkers, and examines the eventual 
acceptance of this notion, generally assumed to have been imported from 
the West, in the light of evidence for the previous existence of related ideas 
in East Asian traditions. The next essay is a short but illuminating consid-
eration of what general conclusions can be drawn from the exceptional 
nature of what took place in Meiji Japan in the wholesale and rapid 
adoption of what was perceived as western science and industrialisation. 
As Kim points out, the events that took place serve as a strong warning 
against any facile lumping together of everything ‘Eastern’ against every-
thing ‘Western.’ Appropriately, we conclude with an essay that brings new 
insight into the ‘why not’ question by considering the case of Korea, and its 
relation to the broad cultural context of East Asia as a whole—a relation 
which, as Kim points out, has not always been treated by Korean scholars 
in the history of science as of central importance.  
The title of the book is Questioning Science in East Asian Contexts. The 
reader of this book will, as I hope I have indicated, gain much from sharing 
the thoughts on this topic expressed by such an acute and experienced 
scholar as Kim. But like any really interesting piece of writing, this book 
provokes further questionings, of which this is one: since the contexts in 
which the ‘questioning of science’ occurs are all (except for the penultimate 
essay) firmly located in pre-modern East Asia, may we not ask what entity 
present in the consciousness of people thinking, acting and writing in pre-
modern China, Korea and Japan is being questioned here?  
The problem I am trying to indicate was brought out very clearly in 
another context by Geoffrey Lloyd in the preface to his early textbook 
(Lloyd, 1970: Preface, n.p.), where he wrote: 
The subject of this study is Greek science … Science is a 
modern category, not an ancient one: there is no one term 
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that is exactly equivalent to our ‘science’ in [ancient] 
Greek … ‘Greek science’ is here used, then, merely as a 
shorthand expression to refer to certain ideas and theories 
in the ancient writers, and it does not presuppose any 
particular view concerning the status of those ideas and 
theories on the part of the ancient writers themselves. 
Approaching the same problem from a different direction, Joseph 
Needham stressed a distinction between ‘modern science,’ which he saw as 
a universal and culture-independent possession of the whole of mankind, 
developing from the beginnings of “the application of mathematical hy-
potheses to nature and the use of the experimental method …” in late pre-
modern Europe, and the radically different and culture-bound forms of 
knowledge which preceded it, whether in pre-modern Europe, East Asia, 
or elsewhere (Needham, 1969, pp. 14-15).  
The issue was set out in its strongest terms a quarter of a century ago, 
when Andrew Cunningham and Perry Williams carefully analysed the 
mode of emergence of the word ‘science’ in its modern sense, a process 
they located as late as the period of the European ‘Age of Revolutions’ 
(1760-1848) (Cunningham and Williams, 1993). It was also in that period 
that they located the birth of the idea that the origins of this new ‘science’ 
were to be found variously in periods in which the French philosophes and 
the German Romantics located their own intellectual origins—seventeenth 
century Europe and ancient Greece respectively. As Cunningham and 
Williams pointed out, much later works such as that of Herbert Butterfield 
on The origins of modern science (Butterfield, 1949, new edn. 1957) essentially 
continued this view, and it is works such as these that have been 
foundational to the institutional construction of the academic discipline of 
‘the history of science’ as embodied in the departmental structures and 
channels of publication within which many of us have chosen to work, or 
have simply found ourselves working, and which have, for better or for 
worse, inevitably shaped our research and teaching agendas throughout 
our working lives.  
As ‘historians of science’ looking at the pre-modern world, it is not easy 
to talk about our work without expressing ourselves in terms that suggest 
that that there was something we can call ‘science’ in (say) second-century 
Alexandria or twelfth-century China, despite the fact that (as in the quota-
tion from Lloyd above) we have to acknowledge that no activity, institution 
or explicitly recognised concept in those times and places corresponded to 
‘science’ as we now use the word. Needham’s universalist Marxism saw a 
whole variety of very disparate pre-modern traditions from all over the 
world as being in some way ancestral or contributory to science as it 
eventually emerged in (for Needham) early modern Europe, but even the 
adoption of that framework does not seem to justify us in projecting 
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‘science’ backwards beyond a certain point in time. So what is it that what 
are we are justified in studying?  
One intriguing way to escape from this historiographical trap would be 
to follow the advice of Martin Rudwick, whom Cunningham and Williams 
quote thus (Cunningham and Williams, 1993, pp. 419-420): 
‘A non-retrospective narrative of any episode in the 
history of science should be couched in terms that the 
historical actors themselves could have recognised and 
appreciated with only minor cultural translation [to help 
the modern reader understand it].’—and this respecting 
of actors’ categories should not be limited to the moment 
when the historian is making his or her historical 
exposition, but should apply also to the categories within 
which the historian conducts his or her researches as well.  
What would this mean in terms of reframing (for instance) a discussion of 
Zhu Xi and ‘science’ into terms that Zhu Xi might have recognised?1 To ask 
this question should not be seen as a criticism of the book that Kim has 
given us: it is, rather, a recognition of the great possibilities that open 
before us thanks to his perceptive writing in the essays reviewed here. 
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1 I have attempted to follow this agenda in, for example, my discussion of suan 
算 in Cullen (2009). 
